| Feature | HardenedBSD | FreeBSD | OpenBSD | NetBSD |
| Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) |  |
* |
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| Base compiled as Position-Independent Executables (PIEs) | |
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| Base compiled with RELRO + BIND_NOW | |
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* |
| Ports tree compiled with PIE, RELRO, and BIND_NOW | |
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| Static PIE | |
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| ASLR brute force protection (SEGVGUARD) | * |
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* |
| Prevention of the creation of writable and executable memory mappings (W^X part one) | |
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| Restrictions on mprotect to prevent switching pages between writable and executable (W^X part two) | |
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| sysctl hardening | |
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| Network stack hardening (IP ID randomization, use IPv6 temporary addresses) | |
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| Executable file integrity enforcement | |
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| Boot hardening | |
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| procfs/linprocfs hardening | |
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* |
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| LibreSSL in base as the default cryptography library | |
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| SROP mitigation | |
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| Most of base sandboxed | |
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| Trusted Path Execution | |
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| SafeStack in base | |
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| SafeStack available in ports | |
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| Non-Cross-DSO Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) in base | |
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| Non-Cross-DSO Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) available in ports | |
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| Base compiled with retpoline | |
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| Ports tree compiled with retpoline | |
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| Intel SMAP+SMEP Support | |
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| Userland stack zero-initialized by default | |
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| Hardened RTLD by default | |
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* Hover over the checkbox for more information
Please note that this page is out-of-date. For a more detailed and up-to-date guide to HardenedBSD's features, please visit our wiki.
